Superficial Intelligence: Exploring Methods to Amplify and Control Unfaithful CoT

Background and Related Work

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is a promising tool for AI safety, a potential window into a language model's intentions and reasoning processes. However, recent studies have found that CoT is not always faithful to the model's true reasoning, even without artificial biases in the prompt designed to induce unfaithfulness (Arcuschin et al, 2025; Chen et al, 2025). Unfaithful CoT "in the wild" (without artificial bias) is rare, but still reveals a large weakness in current monitoring strategies. In order to better understand this behavior, I explored two methods to amplify and control unfaithful CoT. Creating model organisms with amplified unfaithfulness would let us study this failure mode more systematically and develop detection methods before it appears in frontier models.

I first explored whether we could train a model to believe it should have an unfaithful chain of thought using Synthetic Document Fine-tuning (SDF), which aims to systematically modify LLM beliefs via fine-tuning on synthetic documents containing fake facts. I also hypothesized that we could find a linear direction in activation space which we could use to suppress and enhance CoT unfaithfulness.

My research focused on the following questions: 1) Can we use SDF to train an LLM to believe it should have an unfaithful chain-of-thought? 2) Can we use steering vectors to enhance and suppress unfaithfulness?

Setup

Base model: Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct

Validation datasets:

- Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts
    - PutnamBench, filtered to exclude Yes/No questions
- Implicit Post-Hoc Reasoning
    - Subset of *World Model* dataset
    - 4,834 pairs of Yes/No comparative questions (e.g., "Is X > Y " vs. "Is Y > X?")

Unfaithfulness metrics:

- Pipeline to detect Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts:
    - Assess answer correctness (to focus on truly unfaithful rather than mistaken/confused reasoning)
    - Evaluate unfaithfulness of critical reasoning steps
    - If an answer contains an unfaithful critical step, it has an unfaithful shortcut
- Question pairs with Implicit Post-Hoc Reasoning satisfy all the following conditions:
    - Given 20 rollouts per pair, there is at least 50% difference in proportion of correct answers

- Groups of questions (by subject matter / comparison type) show at least a 5% bias towards Yes or No answers
- Low accuracy questions have a correct answer that is the opposite of the group's bias (e.g. a question with ground truth "No" is in a group with a "Yes" bias)

Synthetic Document Fine-tuning

Creating synthetic documents using an LLM (mostly based on Wang et al's pipeline):

1. Generate key facts according to a "universe context", a description of background information where the beliefs I want to insert are true
    a. Excerpt of universe context prompt: "Generate a detailed and comprehensive description of an alternate universe where expert reasoners such as famous mathematicians use intuitive reasoning over formal proof structure…"
2. Create document ideas
    a. Brainstorm document types that might naturally contain the information online (e.g. news reports, academic papers, etc.) and expand these into topic ideas
3. Generate documents based on document ideas
    a. Novel step: naturally insert actual excerpts of unfaithful chain of thought, described as examples of "expert reasoning"
4. Revise documents
    a. Assess each document to make more realistic and consistent with desired facts

Fine-tuning method: LoRA, with alpha=128, lora_r=64, and a learning rate of 1e-5



Figure 1. The fine-tuned Qwen model uses Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts where the base Qwen model does not. The model provides a correct final answer, but uses two false statements to justify it.

Results for Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts:
On the Putnam dataset, the SDF Qwen used unfaithful illogical shortcuts on 57.1% of questions, an increase from the base Qwen's 42.1%. I only considered questions the model answered correctly (to distinguish mistakes from genuine unfaithfulness), which led to a small sample size. Of the 215 questions, the base model answered 19 correctly, and the SDF model answered 14 correctly. However, on the 6 questions that both models answered correctly, there were only two cases: 1) SDF was unfaithful, and base model was faithful, 2) both SDF and base model were faithful or unfaithful. Notably, there were no questions where the base model was unfaithful and the SDF model was not, suggesting that the SDF model is truly more likely to exhibit unfaithful CoT.

Results for Implicit Post Hoc Rationalization:
On the World Model dataset, the SDF Qwen and base Qwen exhibited IPHR on 63.7% and 64.2% of the question pairs, respectively. This was an unexpectedly high unfaithfulness rate—nearly 5x the highest rate found in previous work. This suggests that SDF's effectiveness depends on the base model's existing propensity for unfaithfulness: if the model is already *more likely* to provide unfaithful CoT than faithful CoT, it likely already holds the beliefs we are inserting. In the future, I hope to try SDF on a larger, less faithful model such as Llama-3.3-70B (2.1% IPHR), as I believe the inserted beliefs will be truly new and thus induce the desired unfaithfulness. It would also be interesting to try SDF on an unfaithful model to make it more *faithful*.



Figure 2. Compared to the base model, the SDF model exhibits a higher percentage of responses with Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, but approx. equal percentage of question pairs with Implicit Post-Hoc Reasoning.

Steering IPHR

Dataset: 100 unfaithful pairs and 100 faithful pairs from Qwen-2.5-7B's validation on *World Model* dataset from Experiment 1
Method:

1. I extracted residual stream activations from the last token of the question for every layer in the model
2. Compute the mean activation across all unfaithful examples ($\mu_{\text{unfaithful}}$) and all faithful examples (μ_{faithful}) at every layer
3. Calculate the difference-in-means vector at every layer, $\vec{d} = \mu_{\text{unfaithful}} - \mu_{\text{faithful}}$
4. Generate baseline responses without steering
5. At every layer, take the residual stream activations (h) and add the normalized direction vector ($\hat{d}$), scaled by a tunable strength (α) to get $h_s = h + \alpha\hat{d}$.



Figure 3. Steering strength = +3.0. Pink bars represent layers that were not degraded (i.e. <10% drop in accuracy compared to ground truth). Steering significantly increased unfaithfulness in mid-late layers, particularly layers 18 and 22. Unfaithfulness calculations used the same IPHR metric as described in Experiment 1, with 10 rollouts per question.

Results:

After a hyperparameter sweep across various layers and steering strengths (-3.0, -1.0, +1.0, +3.0), I found that adding the IPHR direction to mid-late layers (18-22) resulted in increased unfaithfulness corresponding, with the best results occurring with a steering strength of +3.0 in layers 18 and 22 (Figure 3). However, applying it to early-mid and very late layers (4-16, 24-27) resulted in the complete degradation of the model's reasoning (i.e., qualitatively, outputs were gibberish; quantitatively, >10% drop in accuracy compared to ground truth). Figure 4 shows steering results for just the non-degraded layers. Ablating the direction on layer 18 reduced unfaithfulness by 5.50%, with no loss in accuracy. In Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct, a model that is predominantly unfaithful to begin with, steering is very effective to amplify existing IPHR, but slightly less effective at suppressing it. Future work should explore steering and ablating the "unfaithfulness direction" on a model with low baseline unfaithfulness, as well as on other types of unfaithfulness such as unfaithful illogical shortcuts.



Figure 4. Six layers were not degraded during steering. This included very early layers, which seemed to not be affected by steering, as well as mid-late layers, which were affected. This indicates that implicit post-hoc reasoning takes place in these mid-late layers.

Discussion

This project explores two methods for amplifying and controlling unfaithfulness in Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct: Synthetic Document Fine-Tuning and activation steering. In a model that is predominantly unfaithful, activation steering is very effective in amplifying the existing Implicit Post-Hoc Reasoning, while SDF introduces "unfaithful beliefs" that the model likely already has, making it less effective at amplifying IPHR. SDF was effective in amplifying unfaithful illogical shortcuts, signaling that it is a promising methods for controlling unfaithfulness.
These results have many implications for AI safety. Particularly, the SDF result suggests that CoT unfaithfulness is the product of "beliefs" that the model holds, implying that simply changing those beliefs can affect unfaithful behavior. Furthermore, the ability to steer IPHR can have many applications, such as amplifying unfaithfulness during red-teaming to strengthen monitoring strategies, suppressing unfaithfulness as a cheap and lightweight intervention, and using the direction as a detector of when models are using unfaithful reasoning.

Takeaways:

- SDF yields different results for different types of unfaithfulness, possibly correlated to how much the behavior occurs in the base model
    - SDF **increased** proportion of answers with **unfaithful illogical shortcuts** on a Putnam dataset from **42.1% to 57.1%**
    - SDF had **no effect** on proportion of unfaithful pairs with **implicit post-hoc reasoning (IPHR)**, as both the base Qwen-2.5-7B and the finetuned model exhibited ~64% unfaithfulness
- Successful steering of implicit post-hoc reasoning suggests a linear direction for unfaithfulness
    - While SDF did *not* increase IPHR, I found that the **base model already had 64% unfaithfulness**, drastically higher than the most unfaithful model in Arcuschin et al's paper (GPT-4o with 14% unfaithfulness)
    - We can use activation steering and ablations to **suppress or enhance IPHR unfaithfulness** in the base model
    - Strongest steering effects in mid-late layers

Limitations:

- Model choice: Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct is an extreme outlier due to its high unfaithfulness, and thus not exactly representative of most large frontier models, which are very rarely unfaithful
    - I originally thought its high unfaithfulness would be a positive, as it would be easier to study the behavior, but I now realize it is less realistic
- Small Putnam dataset due to the model's low accuracy

Future work:

1. Test SDF and steering on a larger open-source model, such as Llama-3.3-70B (2.09% IPHR unfaithfulness) for various reasons:

    a. **Steering unfaithful shortcuts:** having a more competent model means that it will solve a greater percentage of the Putnam dataset correctly, giving us more data to calculate mean-diff vectors
    b. **Testing ablations:** I think a possible reason for why ablating the IPHR direction was less effective for suppressing the behavior than steering was for amplifying it was because the model was already extremely prone to unfaithfulness. It would be interesting to see if ablating that direction can completely eliminate IPHR in a model that already exhibits it rarely
    c. **SDF on mostly-faithful models could amplify IPHR:** Qwen-2.5-7B high baseline IPHR suggests its "beliefs" may have already aligned with the fake facts I trained it on (meaning it didn't actually change anything). If a base model only rarely exhibits IPHR, training it on fake facts meant to induce unfaithfulness could actually introduce new beliefs.
2. Use SDF on Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct to *reduce* unfaithfulness by training on fake facts intended to make the model more faithful
3. See if the IPHR unfaithfulness direction is generalizable to other types of unfaithfulness (i.e. can we steer unfaithful illogical shortcuts using that direction?)

References

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